Friday, December 25, 2009

Zardari vs. Pak Military



The current turmoil in Pakistan basically pitches Pakistanis and their military against a combine of Zardari-Haqqani-Malik and America.

This means the President, his Ambassador to Washington, and his Interior Minister, backed by the United States, versus the judiciary, the nation of Pakistan and the military.

If you are a keen observer, you will not miss the telltale signs.

One of them was on display today, Dec. 24, on the front page of The News International, Pakistan’s largest English-language newspaper.

My colleague Mr. Rauf Klassra ran a juicy story titled, When it comes to keeping gifts, army rulers outdo civilians’. It’s about two former military rulers of Pakistan illegally retaining state gifts presented by foreign dignitaries to Pakistani presidents and prime ministers.

The story, if accurate, is fair.


But a day earlier, the same author, my colleague Mr. Klasra, ran another juicy story titled, ‘Zardari excels in keeping foreign gifts worth millions.’

See?

It’s a tit-for-tat. The paper publishes a story showing a greedy President Zardari gobbling up state gifts. The very next day, another story appears that accuses military rulers of ‘outdoing’ civilian rulers in greed.

What does this mean?

First, it shows the mindset in the Zardari camp. They do see the Pakistani military as their prime target. This, of course, is no longer a secret. Mr. Zardari and his closest aides had their sights on the military and specifically on ISI from the day the incumbent government seized power last year. And this is not about any domestic Pakistani political agenda. It is about fulfilling conditions in the secret deal brokered by US Department of State that brought Mr. Zardari to power in Pakistan.

Second, this tit-for-tat reveals the fight-back strategy of the Zardari government. And it’s simple:


1.       Move the focus of the Pakistani public opinion away from the massive corruption and ineptitude of the incumbent government by turning this into a civil-military dispute.

2.      Raise the specter of rebellion in Sindh against Pakistan if Zardari is no longer in power.


This is the outline of the Zardari comeback plan. There is one more card up Mr. Zardari's sleeve and that's US diplomats in Islamabad quietly lobbying other key public figures to support Mr. Zardari in exchange for a piece of America's soft power in favor of this or that politician.

As for whipping up sentiments against the Pakistani military, it probably is already obvious to Mr. Zardari and his aides that this won’t happen any time soon. His government is so inept that it succeeded in pushing Pakistanis toward the judiciary and the military in less than two years. No one except idealistic fools have any faith in politicians.

As for the so-called Sindh card, I couldn’t come up with a better and more shocking retort than the following paragraph by Ameer Bhutto, Benazir’s first cousin who wrote an eye-opening op-ed in today’s The News:


“Sindh today is a far cry from the Sindh of 27 December 2007 and if anyone expects Sindhis to react in the same way as they did back then, they are deluded. One example illustrates my point: On 31 May 2009 the chief minister Sindh and some of his ministers held an open kutchery of mostly their own party workers in Naodero. So enraged was the public at the government's failure to give any relief that they not only confronted the chief minister and his ministers with harsh words, but were becoming so physically aggressive that the police had to herd the VIPs inside a rest house to save them from their own party workers. The furious people attacked the rest house and shattered the windows. Fearing the worse, the rangers were summoned and the VIPs were piled into bullet-proof vehicles and rushed away to a safe location, but not before the people succeeded in pelting the vehicles with stones. If the People's Party workers can do this to their own government in Naodero, Benazir Bhutto's hometown and the epicenter of the People's Party, then one can imagine the situation in other areas of Sindh.”

I can only add this piece of advice to the trio of Mr. Zardari, Mr. Haqqani and Mr. Malik:

The American-protected NRO is over. The man who facilitated it in Pakistan, Mr. Musharraf, made a better judgment and fled. The Pakistani military was dragged into the deal along with the people of Pakistan because some [like me, in the interest of full disclosure] erred by retaining some faith in that Mr. Musharraf won’t blunder. Now it appears the military is not interested in protecting US interest when the US won’t reciprocate.

The writing is on the wall. Pakistani nation has been through hell in the past three years. We won’t allow you or anyone else to serve a foreign agenda using our tax money.

Thursday, December 24, 2009

Merry Christmas Pakistan



Merry Christmas to all of our Pakistani Christians, and to all of our friends worldwide. We in Pakistan need to keep reminding ourselves of the great sacrifices all Pakistanis made, including Pakistani Christians, for an independent Pakistan. I am lucky to have copies of pamphlets that Pakistani Christians spread in Quetta, Karachi and Lahore in 1947 against the Brits and the Indians and in favor of Pakistan. When a group of feudal members of Punjab Assembly refused to endose the demand for Pakistan, it was Pakistani Christians who tilted the vote in Pakistan's favor. So we're proud of all of our people.

Merry Christmas Pakistan.

Wednesday, December 23, 2009

America's Intrusive Ambassador In Pakistan




While the Boston Globe advises President Obama to scale back meddling in Pakistani politics, US Ambassador to Pakistan Anne W. Patterson launches a covert campaign to convince politicians to support President Zardari.

The disconnect is breathtaking. Globe's position ("Show US neutrality in Pakistan") also serves to signify how much the US public opinion is unaware of the extent of the intrusive presence of the United States in Pakistan. Part of what US officials describe as rising anti-Americanism in the country is actually nothing more than Pakistani backlash for this meddling.

Mr. Zardari's team and his closest aides - especially Interior Minister Rehman Malik and Ambassador in Washington Husain Haqqani - have been on a collision course with the Pakistani military. They have permitted possibly tens of private US defense contractors - private militias, to be accurate - into Pakistan.  Moreover, Pakistanis have strong reasons to believe that Mr. Zardari and his team had consented to some conditions, or secret understandings, with Washington prior to taking charge in Pakistan last year. It is no secret that the incumbent pro-US Pakistani government is the result of a 'deal' brokered by the Bush administration in 2007. That deal imposed the current set of discredited politicians on Pakistan.  In some ways, this was the third US-led regime change, after Kabul and Baghdad. But unlike those two capitals, regime-change in Pakistan happened without the need for a full fledged military invasion. This was and continues to be an achievement for US diplomacy and military, and a moment of shame for most Pakistanis.

To be fair, Washington could not have done it without the help of Pakistani insiders. Former strongman Musharraf was under no compulsion to agree to this wild American idea. Yet for inexplicable reasons he chose to agree to a power-sharing agreement with late Benazir Bhutto, as part of the US-brokered deal.

It is encouraging to see some Americans - like the editorial writer at Boston Globe - cut through the fog of official US media manipulation and see developments in Pakistan through Pakistani perspective.  But most Americans don't know, for example, how their envoy here, Ms. Anne W. Patterson, is quietly meeting Pakistani politicians at private residences of trusted friends to strategize domestic politics. These meetings are not acknowledged by the US Embassy or by Pakistani politicians and hence do not make it to the front pages of Pakistani newspapers. 

More recently, a US defense contractor on whose behalf Ms. Patterson lobbied senior Pakistani officials for special weapon permits was found to have paid bribes to a Pakistani minister's aide to the tune of US $ 250,000. In short, the US ambassador's name came up several times during a case of bribery involving the national security of the host country.

Pakistani politicians in government are too timid to put the US government on notice about the extracurricular activities of its diplomats in Pakistan.

[This is one blatant aspect of US meddling in Pakistan. Another is the flurry of media reports in the US complaining about Pakistani harassment of US diplomats. Those leaks were stunning by all accounts because they showed the US at the receiving end of Pakistani high handedness. The reality is totally different but who cares. US government spinners released the story first and that's what counts. Pakistanis are lousy at media projection anyway. More on this later.]

So, who will stop Ms. Patterson from trying to manipulate Pakistani politics? And why such a heavy US investment in the Zardari government? And why is the US orchestrating the encirclement of the Pakistani military, from the borders of Afghanistan to the civilian pro-US government in Islamabad?

And the most important question: Is Pakistan the enemy? Every US move in the region says it is. Even the financial aid is being used as an instrument of coercive policy rather than an instrument of development, which is what US officials never tire of telling us. Here again the US official language says one thing and does another.

Monday, December 21, 2009

Assassination of Pakistani Officers

This report, titled Strategic Punishment: A Program To Assassinate Pakistani Military Officers, provides a brief and direct insight into the core of the dispute between Islamabad and Washington. It is recommended reading for those trying to understand the Pakistani perspective, which is generally ignored or misrepresented in the American and British media.


Thursday, December 17, 2009

This Time, Iftikhar Chaudhry Is A Hero

I never considered Iftikhar Chaudhry a hero for democracy or judiciary but more of a hero of chance and circumstance. But his verdict on NRO makes him one without a question.

There were some doubts about Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry but he laid them all to rest. This is a victory for Pakistan. It destroys a major tool of American-British interference in Pakistani politics. 

One thing to remember here is this: This verdict was possible ONLY because an army chief intervened in March this year and because the military was willing to quietly support the judiciary against possible political pressure. These corrupt and inept politicians would have NEVER restored the chief justice. This tells you something about how deformed our political system is.

[The point is not that the army deserves credit. It doesn't. The point is that the corrupt Pakistani system is so entrenched that despite popular demand by the media and the people, politicians weren’t interested in restoring the CJ or in annulling a US- and UK-brokered law that legalized corruption in Pakistan.]

Now let’s hope the verdict is implemented to the fullest and the politicians and bureaucracy don’t create hurdles. Pakistani nation is thirsty for the blood of those members of this pro-US government who have sold Pakistan for cheap.

[More analysis on this coming shortly.]



Thursday, December 10, 2009

Latest From US & Indian Ambassadors In Pakistan



US Ambassador Anne W. Patterson has launched a series of covert meetings with Pakistani politicians seeking support for President Zardari, and her Indian counterpart has just organized a music and booze party on the very day as hundreds of Pakistani families, four Pakistanis cities, and at least one large political party observed a day of mourning. Pakistan is open to foreign meddling like never before, probably the only nuclear power in the world exposed to outside powers in this manner, thanks to sold-out ruling elite.

CLICK HERE TO READ THE FULL REPORT

Monday, December 7, 2009

Pakistan's Killer Hospitals




Thanks to Imanae’s parents, one aspect of Pakistan’s sick national life has come to light. What about the rot in the entire system?

Early this year, an elderly man was admitted to Al Shifa International, an elite hospital in the Pakistani capital and one of the most expensive in Pakistan.

The man had a heart attack and his age -- approximately 90 -- did not permit a bypass surgery. Yet the hospital management tried to initiate surgery. At one point, the management tried to do it behind his family's back, moving him to the operation theater. He was saved when a family friend on the staff telephoned the elderly man's family at midnight to warn them. They lived a couple of blocks away and rushed to save him.

The hospital was trying to inflate the bill.

Two of of the old patient's children were practicing doctors, one serving in the United States and the other one in Saudi Arabia, in addition to a son in law, a Dutch citizen, who was also a doctor. All of them agreed their elderly patient did not require a bypass. They couldn’t believe the highly paid doctors employed by the elite hospital did not know what they knew.

In 2007, an 80-year-old man and a heart patient came to the same hospital's outdoor patient's department for a minor checkup. He was supposed to leave in a couple of hours but left the hospital dead three days later because a nurse mistakenly gave him a high potency sedative. The old man's heart couldn't take it.

The suspicion is that he was deliberately administered the sedative to prolong his hospital stay and eventually the final bill. Otherwise, who gives a sedative overdose to an 85-year-old heart patient?

Such blunders are common and there is no law to protect patients. Every month or so there is a story on TV about relatives of a dead patient protesting fatal treatment on the part of doctors. These incidents are more common in privately-owned hospitals, and especially in the few elitist ones owned and operated by groups of investors.

For example, Al Shifa International in Islamabad is well known as ‘The Killer Hospital … where your loved ones can be killed for money!’. This is not an exaggeration. There is a website dedicated for this [Check http://shifa-hospital-islamabad.com/].

The latest is the case of 3-year-old Imanae Malik [http://www.imanae.co.uk/], an only child who was taken to another elitist hospital, Doctor's Hospital, in Lahore for a minor hand burn but she died because of a tranquilizer overdose. The doctor on duty was not even a full children's doctor but a trainee.

For-profit hospitals are common worldwide. But in Pakistan, the for-profit part trumps everything else, literally.

‘Cheap’ doctors and nurses are hired because money is the number one consideration because the management is answerable to a group of investors who in turn are answerable to no one.

Health department officials in the federal and provincial government are corrupt and easily bribed.

The politicians are corrupt, untrained, uneducated and uninterested. Pakistan is afflicted by a failed form of democracy that has been taken over by ethnic and religious politics where nothing of public good can be done. The political elite keeps its money and homes outside Pakistan, mostly UK and Dubai, and sees Pakistan as a place to make easy money through corruption.

Recently, documents released by the government show that almost the entire ruling elite - politicians, feudal lords, businessmen, bureaucrats and some military officers -- have been jointly stealing from Pakistani banks with impunity over the years.

Thanks to the courageous parents of Imanae, one aspect of the sick Pakistani national life has come to light.

But no one is expected to touch the rich owners of these hospitals. This is one of those things that will linger until there is a bloody revolution here, or a benevolent dictator who will sort out the mess while executing the corrupt. You see, Pakistan stands at a point where it can learn more from Iran and China and Putin’s Russia than from the US and the UK or Europe.


Saturday, November 28, 2009

India's Mumbai Evidence 'Theatrical'




[In Urdu] Hafiz Mohammad Saeed's international attorney describes his meetings with UN officials where he proved to them how India is using Mumbai to get back at India's Kashmiri opponents fighting its illegal occupation of Kashmir. Attorney Haider Rasul Mirza also confirmed there is no evidence against Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, a Kashmiri freedom group. India's noise in this regard is theatrical. Interview by Ahmed Quraishi.

Launching Ceremony of First Indigenously Manufactured JF-17 Thunder in Pakistan




Launched on 23 November 2009.

Thursday, November 26, 2009

Ahmed Quraishi's Mumbai Challenge: Let's Talk About Hindu Terror



A Salute To Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi

Mr. Jatoi, right, in this undated file photo.

As our convoy approached the border between Iraq and Jordan, we were shocked to see the refugee camps. Egyptians, Indians, Philippinos, Sri Lankans and others were waiting for their governments in tents in the middle of a harsh and hot desert because the Jordanian government was not letting them in.

This was early September 1990.  Iraq had just invaded Kuwait.  The region was in a mess.

Imagine this: When these thousands were running after donations of food and water, Pakistanis by the thousands were the only nationality that was given immediate entry into Jordan and an impeccable treatment and arrangements after that.

Pakistani leaders rarely work like this. But it was Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi who came to the rescue of thousands of Pakistanis stranded in Kuwait and Iraq nineteen years ago.  He was just an interim Prime Minister, but he outperformed the governments of India, the Philippines, Egypt, Sri Lanka, Lebanon and literally gave them a lesson in looking after their citizens abroad.

And Mr. Jatoi did it in an impressive way.

Thanks to his personal interest, thousands of Pakistanis received the kind of treatment that left the citizens of other countries in envy.

I was just 18 then.  And what I saw on that day on the Jordanian border and in the following three days made me immensely proud to be a Pakistani.

Thousands of Pakistanis were given priority treatment by border officers of the Jordanian army.  While others waited for days on the border, Pakistanis were allowed entry without hassle.

Once in Jordan, they were escorted all the way to the Jordanian capital, where a five-star accommodation awaited them in a sprawling, centrally air-conditioned complex. Families stayed for a maximum of three days before being flown on chartered Iberian Airlines flights to different cities of Pakistan. Once landed, every breadwinner in those families received a token financial gift from the Government of Pakistan as initial help.

This excellent and flawless arrangement was the work of Mr. Jatoi, a great Pakistani patriot who came from the a culturally rich part of Pakistan: Sindh.

I was one of the few or maybe the only Pakistani there who fluently spoke, read and wrote Arabic.  The Foreign Office Liaison Team picked me up to help them communicate with the Jordanians on small, day-to-day logistical issues.  I can't forget how, when a BBC crew visited the complex to meet the refugees, it refused to film because, as one of their team members said, what they saw did not look like a refugee camp. "This is a five-star hotel," he said. And it really was.

Having been born and educated in Arabic schools in the Middle East, this was the first time I heard the name Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi.

And I heard his name from the Pakistan Foreign Office Team stationed at the complex.  I was impressed at the arrangements so I asked them if this is how things were run in Pakistan.

"Not at all," laughed one of the diplomats. "This arrangement is thanks to Mr. Jatoi.  He was concerned at reports on the situation of Pakistanis stranded in the area."

A minority of pseudo 'liberals' and 'democrats' in Pakistan had the audacity to criticize Mr. Jatoi in their obituaries. This veiled criticism was focused on the fact that Mr. Jatoi accepted national duties, as in overseeing an interim government and national elections, when elected governments were removed by the Pakistani military.

I say what a lousy excuse this is to criticize a patriot like Mr. Jatoi.  As a Pakistani, I am proud of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, who served his nation with honor. We want hundreds more like Mr. Jatoi to replace these fake democrats and corrupt politicians.

Mr. Jatori died in London this week at age 78.  He was buried in his hometown near Nawabshah.

I salute the Honorable Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, former Prime Minister of Pakistan.

May his soul rest in peace.

Wednesday, November 25, 2009

A Bunker In The Heart Of Islamabad





I was passing by this bunker-type police checkpoint and took this snap using my cell phone. It saddened me no end to see this in the heart of Islamabad in November 2009. The reason for my sadness is that I wrote an analysis titled, Plan To Topple Pakistan Military, in Nov 2007. The paper was based on some evidence indicating Indian activity in Afghanistan centered on inserting agents into Pakistan’s tribal belt, these agents being a mix of Indians and others working for Karzai’s spymasters.

The findings of that analysis linked terrorism in our entire western belt to a CIA-India-Karzai nexus that exploited festering local Pakistani problems. No one at the time believed it. I brought the theory to the attention of the highest people's in the country at the time. Unfortunately, those in power used the insight for political reasons [sustain the government] and chose to trust the Americans, who at the time were planning to shift their Afghan mess to Pakistan. Since then, Chinese interests have been attacked on Pakistani soil for the first time, GHQ has been attacked for the first time, and ethnic terrorism is in action in Balochistan using a Pakistani ethnic rebel leader based in safe houses in Kabul.

I am one of countless Pakistanis now who are glad to read Gen. Kayani's statement on US policy in Afghanistan, and Gen. Tariq Majeed's tough retort to US propaganda on our nukes.

It is time for Pakistan to get out of America’s failed war in Afghanistan and take a stand on anti-Pakistan terrorism launched from that US-controlled country.

Monday, November 23, 2009

The Diplomat Interview with Ahmed Quraishi





‘It is Pakistan that needs to complain, and complain loudly’

An Interview with Ahmed Quraishi, by Jason Miks



The Diplomat speaks with Pakistani commentator Ahmed Quraishi about the country’s current military offensive in Waziristan, relations with the US and what America should do to improve its image in Pakistan.



US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was in Pakistan this month meeting key political leaders. What did you make of her comment that she finds it difficult to believe that nobody in the Pakistani government knows the whereabouts of top al-Qaeda members?

Ahmed Quraishi: It was very surprising to even the most hardened skeptics here in Pakistan to hear a US secretary of state saying this, because despite all we heard during the eight years of President [George W.] Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney, no American official accused Pakistan or ‘rogue elements’ in the country of supporting or protecting al-Qaeda. If ever there were any grievances with Pakistan on this count, they were mostly focused on that Pakistan had done a very good job of cooperating with the Americans on al-Qaeda, but that progress was still lacking on the Afghan Taliban and its leadership. So in the entire eight years since September 11, no US official actually criticized Pakistan by saying Pakistan was somehow trying to protect al-Qaeda.

Second, the facts contradict what the secretary of state said. Everybody knows the vast number of al-Qaeda operatives that have been arrested have been arrested in Pakistan. And the big fish names, although there is close cooperation between the CIA and ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence], were arrested thanks to crucial information coming from Pakistani intelligence sources. This is, of course, natural seeing as it is our country, and it’s only to be expected that the ISI and other Pakistani government agencies should be at the forefront of finding these people. And they did.

And three, another crucial point is that if we’re going to throw blame at each other, then frankly speaking it is Pakistan that needs to complain--and complain loudly--at the failure of US intelligence and the US military back in late November and early December 2001 to corner and arrest Osama bin Laden. If you remember the battle in Tora Bora on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, that battle was instrumental at providing an escape route to the al-Qaeda chief and his liuetenanats. And the biggest blame for that actually goes to US intelligence, which relied on unreliable Afghan warlords on the ground who apparently took money, probably from al-Qaeda operatives, and let Osama bin Laden escape.

So if anyone should be complaining it should be the Pakistanis, who now have to deal with this country’s mess, basically because many of these people who should have been eliminated in Afghanistan were able to disperse and mostly head for Pakistan. And this is mostly because of the thin American presence in Afghanistan, the poorly secured military presence in that country and of course the poorly secured border.

One of the reasons Secretary Clinton was visiting was to try and improve the US image in Pakistan. How much of an image problem does the US have there?

Quraishi: In this whole debate about America’s image in Pakistan, and people talk of course about how America supported a military dictator [General Pervez Musharraf] and so forth, the reality is that the real grievances pertain to issues that are not really discussed very openly, especially in the American media, and which are not really known about by American public opinion. I’m talking about things like, for example, the fact that the US military and the Afghan army, which is being trained by the US army, suddenly removed all their posts from the Afghan side of the border when Pakistan began its military operation in South Waziristan.

This isn’t the figment of anyone’s imagination--it has been verified by people on the ground and was raised by the Pakistani chief with General Stanley McCrystal a couple of weeks back. This story was headline news on major Pakistani news channels and in newspapers, so it’s surprising that so little time has been given over to such grievances, which provide fodder to skeptics in Pakistan who question US motives in Afghanistan.

And of course we have a standing complaint that weapons and money that are sustaining terrorists are coming from Afghanistan. And it’s not just the factor of Afghan warlords and drug money and so forth. It’s beyond that. And we feel little time is given to this grievance in the US media. US officials know about it, and often discuss the issue with Pakistani officials, but they never talk about this openly. So I find it very funny when Secretary Clinton comes over here and says ‘you have some questions about our role, and we have some grievances about yours, but we need to reach some common ground.’ Sure. But this entire thing that is going on in the Af-Pak region is a result of US policy. And eight years on, this project is falling apart and isn’t showing any signs of being nearer a conclusion than it was, say, five years ago. So serious questions are arising about why in Pakistan we continue to be part of a project that shows every signs of failing, if it has not already failed.

What would you like to see the US doing differently to improve its image?

Quraishi: Two things. One is that in terms of foreign policy, on its policy on Afghanistan, it needs to take its Pakistani ally along as it moves on. What has happened over the past eight years is that Pakistan was not taken along in US planning on Afghanistan. A government was set up in Kabul that was decidedly full of anti-Pakistan elements, elements that are antagonistic to Pakistan. Now when I say this I don’t mean that the Afghan government should be pro-Paksitan. But they should not be antagonistic. So the United States and the different stakeholders in policy in Afghanistan, including the intelligence community and the military, will have to trust Pakistan and take it along as an ally, and not treat it as someone to be looked upon with suspicion, or to be used for logistical help it needs but to then not trust it on the long-term questions of what kind of government should be in Kabul and whether the Pashtuns need to be isolated from such a government or not.

Number two, the United States needs to understand that it is counter productive to try and interfere in the domestic politics of Pakistan. Very few observers in the United States discuss a very interesting thing that they have been doing in Pakistan, which is to try and micromanage that country. The very government we have in Pakistan right now, the elected government in Islamabad, wouldn’t have been in place without a deal that was discussed and tailored and finalized at the US State Department with the active participation of diplomats from the United States and United Kingdom. And, of course, with the full backing of Vice President Cheney at that time. That deal resulted in tailoring the political set up that you currently see in Pakistan, and it dealt with such minute issues as who would be the coalition partner, which parties could work with the United States, and which ones could not.

So this kind of micromanagement has really backfired--when the United States was tailoring this kind of deal with Musharraf, the anti-Americanism in Pakistan was not at a level it is at right now. So this tells you something at least about how the micromanagement has backfired and has produced possibly an exaggerated feeling of a threat among the ordinary Pakistani on the street.

As you mentioned, the Pakistani military recently embarked on a major offensive in Waziristan. What do you think the prospects for success are?

Quraishi: There’s no question that a ragtag army of mountain fighters who do not enjoy the full support of the people of the area they are based in--the people of that area are pouring into other parts of Pakistan where temporary camps have been set up for as long as this military operation goes on--that such a militia cannot sustain itself in the face of a large and well-organized army.

Of course, when the Pakistan army began the Swat operation in the spring of this year, there was a lot of skepticism--especially when almost 2 million people from that area poured into refugee camps, people were asking how that problem would be dealt with. But now, over 1.5 million people have been restored to their towns and villages in the Swat region, and that region is overwhelmingly secure now.

There’s no reason why this cant be replicated in South Waziristan. Its a small patch of land. The only uncertainty we really have is over the Afghan side of the border--there aren’t enough Afghan soldiers on that side, and there are no US military or ISAF on the other side. This is a constant problem and we know money and weapons are coming through from that side. The Mehsud terror militia is not sustaining itself from inside Pakistan. I understand that Pakistani officers have had assurances from General McCrystal that he will do what he can with the resources he has in Afghanistan to secure that area and ensure that such movement doesn’t occur backward and forward. But we’ll have to wait and see. At the moment though, the prospects look good.

© 2007-2009. All rights reserved. AhmedQuraishi.com & PakNationalists
Verbatim copying and distribution of this entire article is permitted in any medium
without royalty provided this notice is preserved.

Warning: Last Chance Before A Military Coup In Pakistan



Saturday, November 21, 2009

French Rap On Pakistan & Its Military




When was the last time you heard a French rap song on Pakistan? Here's your chance to do this. A French rapper of Pakistani origin salutes the nation and its men and women in the armed forces.

Saturday, November 14, 2009

Step Aside Mathew Rosenberg, Welcome Ansar Abbasi

A small group of Pakistani journalists are protesting because one Pakistani newspaper has accused Mathew Rosenberg, an India-based American correspondent for the Wall Street Journal of being a spy. The editor of Wall Street Journal is 'disgusted'. Under new directions from Mrs. Clinton, US diplomats are aggressively engaged in a media battle in Pakistan. Part of the game is raising a new class of US apologists – commentators, editors, journalists. Mr. Rosenberg may not be a spy but here is a Pakistani lesson for the US media.

Click here to read the full story.

Haqqani Should Buy Zardari A New Maximilian



The Zardari-Nawaz musical chairs stands exposed before the Pakistani people. Syed Faisal Saleh Hayat appears on Ahmed Quraishi's TSS [Sunday, Nov. 15, 08:00 pm-Aag TV] to issue this warning: this is the last chance for the politicians and the expanded ruling elite. Anjum Niaz puts that warning in perspective in this column in her unique style.

Click here to read the full column

Friday, November 13, 2009

Pledge Of PakNationalism By Young Pakistanis



America's Sleazeball Haqqani




In the thick of the debate over Kerry-Lugar bill in Pakistan, Ambassador Husain Haqqani came under unprecedented attack. In fact, he is the only Pakistani ambassador to US who was ruthlessly criticized in the federal parliament for two days, with open demands that he be recalled from Washington. There are two reasons he survived. One is Mr. Zardari, and the second is the terrorist attack on the GHQ building in Rawalpindi. Pakistan's isolated President sees Mr. Haqqani as his man in Washington, entrusted with ensuring that Washington keeps its part of the 'deal' that brought his government to power. Interestingly, the Americans see Haqqani as their man, entrusted with ensuring that Zardari and Pakistan's military keep their parts of the 'deal'. When Mr. Haqqani sensed the noose tightening around his neck, he tried to play smart, using the Foreign Policy magazine to leak out a message to whom it may concern in Islamabad [and Rawalpindi]. The Nation published this message in a story titled If Fired, Haqqani Threatens To Reveal 'Reams' of Pakistani Secrets on Oct. 14. Mr. Haqqani didn't anticipate that someone will catch his subtle message. So he slapped a defamation suit. But he certainly wasn't expecting this response from The Nation. Here it is in case you missed it.

Tuesday, November 10, 2009

Shireen Mazari On Seymour Hersh

In Bob Woodward’s book, “Bush at War”, he recalls how when he (Woodward) quoted Hersh to Bush, the latter replied that Seymour Hersh was a liar! Hersh’s article “Defending the Arsenal” in The New Yorker (November 16, 2009) has predictably caused a stir in Pakistan. But this always happens after the event; after foreign journalists have been given excessive access into the corridors of power in Pakistan. So it has been with Hersh. Now the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claims Hersh has a well-known “anti-Pakistan” bias. If that is the case, then did the MFA give an official perspective on how much access Hersh should have been given in Pakistan? Did they advise the President to avoid meeting this man or did they give any official brief to the President on what to say to him on sensitive issues? Clearly, the Zardari meeting with Hersh has no reflection of the MFA or any official Pakistani position. Instead, there is a reflection of ignorance with the President declaring that our army officers are “British-trained”!

CLICK HERE TO READ THE FULL COLUMN


Peter Chamberlin: Why Not Criticize The Army, Ahmed?


US journalist and commentator Peter Chamberlin [Therearenosunglasses's Weblog] makes some insightful comments on my report below.  He has written with insight on Pakistani affairs.  He believes Pakistani military cooperation with US plans for our region is an important part of the problem and that Pakistani patriots are giving the Pakistani military a pass on its role.  Like the Pakistani society, opinions and analysis vary within the Pakistani military on US strategic role in our region. Mr. Chamberlin's comments here should help the debate. Read his comments in red below.

By PETER CHAMBERLIN

Tuesday, 10 November 2009.

WWW.AHMEDQURAISHI.COM

Ahmed,

I felt like commenting on your fine report, when I posted on my website.  I posted it as a comment on the article, but I thought you might like to see it as it was written.  Keep hammering, maybe reason might persuade your leaders to oppose mine.

Peter

American Psyops Destroying Pakistani Morale

[Ahmed is a great patriotic defender of Pakistan and he always calls the political leaders out when they sell-out.  Like most Pakistani patriots though, he is hesitant to criticize the Army for the trouble that is boiling over there, even though Army cooperation with the United States is perhaps the biggest problem of all.  Like I have been trying to point out for a couple of years, if the Army continues to cooperate with US planners and behind the scenes maneuvers, then Pakistan will not likely survive much longer.  The Army must convince Obama that it works for the Pakistani people and not for him.  It does this by resisting American calls for civil war and restoring all the displaced Pashtuns back to their homes and filling them with the will to resist.]

Nuclear Doubts: Pakistani Weakness Is Eroding Internal Morale, Fast

By AHMED QURAISHI
Tuesday, 10 November 2009.

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan—Two curious aspects of the New Yorker story on Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is that the report singles out the Pakistani military – and not the civilian government – as partner in alleged secret negotiations with the Obama administration to secure Pakistan's nuclear weapons.  The other is the objective behind leaking the story – if indeed some US officials helped in leaking details – since the story only serves to make it more difficult for Pakistani officials cooperating with Washington on the nuclear question.

[Strange as it seems, that is the way that the CIA undermines nations--it purposely complicates situations it wants to change, so that it can knock them down later.  It is of strategic value to keep the nuclear issue in conflict.  It is not really looking for cooperation on the nuclear issue, rather it is looking for complete capitulation to American Zionist demands.]

In May, when Boston Globe published a similar story quoting unnamed and unverifiable sources revealing that Pakistani officials have accepted a proposal to ship some highly enriched uranium to the United States for disposal, there was no reference whatsoever to Pakistani military.  The Globe depicted the talks as a government-to-government exercise.

For all intents, the latest story seeks to embarrass the Pakistani military.  This probably explains the immediate reaction of the US Ambassador to Pakistan Anne W. Patterson.  Not that she actually denied the alleged talks.  Her written statement was carefully worded to deny her government's "intention to seize Pakistani nuclear weapons or material."

[Patterson was probably telling a diplomat's version of the "truth," they don't intend to "seize" Pakistan's nukes, they expect the Army to simply hand them over.]

The element of embarrassment also explains the statement of Pakistan’s Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee General Tariq Majid, who made it a point to respond to the question, 'How much does US really know about Pakistan's nuclear program?'  In a sharp public retort uncommon to Pakistan's top military brass, Gen. Majeed answered, ‘Only that much as they can guess and nothing more’.

Important parts of Mr. Seymour Hersh's investigative story remain unaddressed.  No government or military official has confirmed or denied the revelation in the New Yorker that former President Pervez Musharraf shared with US officials information about the number of warheads, their locations and their security plan.  Considering the embarrassing concessions that he gave the Americans (he allowed US diplomats, officials and military personnel unprecedented privileges at Pakistani airports at a time when Pakistani officials were humiliated on entry to US.  Pakistan has withdrawn those concessions.)

[There should be no doubt in Pakistan, even within the Army, that Musharraf handed the country to Bush and waged war against the people afterwords, to please him.  Why wouldn't  the keys already be in US hands?]

(It is also important to question some of Mr. Hersh's findings, which border on the ridiculous.  The last time Mr. Hersh visited Pakistan was five years ago by his own statement.  Yet he concluded that since the few politicians, journalists and retired generals he met this time did not offer him Johnny Walker Black this must be a sign of growing religious extremism in Pakistan and in the ranks of Pakistan military.  At other places, he has exaggerated the impact of two retired army officers that he interviewed on soldiers and middle rank officers.  Mr. Hersh appeared to have made little effort to use his visit to the country to try to understand the real Pakistan. Instead, he felt comfortable regurgitating media stereotypes. Which is fine since his report fits in with the overall US political and military policy thrust with regards to Pakistan.)

Mr. Hersh's report comes six months after the Boston Globe story that broke the news on behind-the-scenes talks between Islamabad and Washington on US proposals to secure Pakistan's nuclear weapons, including a US suggestion to ship out Pakistani uranium.  No one in Islamabad denied the story at the time.  The fixed Pakistani response to such stories has not changed much in recent years: that Pakistan has an excellent command and control regime and that Pakistan does not need outside help to secure its arsenal.

So, is the Pakistani government or military really talking secretly with the Americans on how to secure Pakistani nukes?

One explanation that retired military officers are giving is that Pakistani officers may be talking nukes to the Americans but not giving them the right information.  If true, this policy line seeks to keep the Americans engaged with Pakistan without allowing Washington any real access.

This is not farfetched. Pakistani civilian and military governments have perfected a uniquely Pakistani version of the American idiom, 'to roll with the punches and survive to fight another day.'  Only that Pakistan never really fights even for what is its legitimate right.  Under this policy, Islamabad has accepted on several occasions to play along, live with the accusations and insinuations about its nuclear program, and hope to stall, engage, and win over the antagonistic elements of the Washington establishment, both political and military.

But the latest report takes the debate to a new level.  Pakistani officials grappling with the PR aspect of this story need to consider the following:

1.       The latest report is particularly demoralizing for ordinary Pakistanis, in the backdrop of an overall deteriorating strategic environment for Pakistani interests, internal and external.  Pakistan's national security managers, civilian and military, need to pay attention to the hypothetical threshold of national morale.  Dangerously low levels of national morale could prove fatal in case of war with India or a US-led military invasion of Pakistani territory from Afghanistan.

[Wearing-out an opponent, without having to actually fight, is the purpose of CIA and military psyops.  When, and if, Pakistani morale sinks so low that agency planners expect complete capitulation with the next shock, then the final shock will soon come, psychological assault will intensify.  It is the "shock doctrine" and the theory of "learned helplessness" rolled into one.  The close cooperation between American and Pakistani military leaders makes it highly unlikely that Kayani and the generals don't understand what is happening.  By looking the other way so often, whenever US operatives are taking actions that are harmful to Pakistan, the Army shares in the guilt for what is being done.   This is the deadly problem that will finish Pakistan off, if left as is.]

2.      Is there someone in Washington, within its political, military and intelligence communities that might have an interest in embarrassing Pakistani officials who are allegedly engaged in secret nuclear talks with Washington?  Is someone trying to sabotage policy initiatives of the Obama administration?  In such a case, Pakistani officials – especially in the Pakistani intelligence community – need to give more weight to reports that anti-Pakistan activities orchestrated on Afghan soil cannot happen without some level of American involvement.

[Ahmed is being too generous concerning American intentions, but he is dead-on about US and NATO forces being complicit in any Indian action against Pakistan from Afghani soil.  Launching attacks against Pakistan from US-controlled territory would require US consent, just like in the case of Israel attacking Iran through US-controlled airspace, it can't be done without American permission.]

3.      That the US media continues to cause tremendous damage to Pakistan's reputation and standing in the international community.  Pakistan is receiving enemy treatment from the US media.  Pakistani officials must understand that US media cannot mount similar attacks on other countries such as Turkey and Egypt because leaderships in those countries generally keep US officials on a leash and leverage Washington's strategic needs to their favor. In Pakistan, we have a ruling elite that is micromanaged from Washington, thanks to a deal that former President Musharraf signed with Washington and London.

[Pakistan will continue to be a pariah nation because of the armies of Islamists that it has trained for the CIA. Until Kayani and the generals stop covering-up what amounts to a shared criminal enterprise run for the CIA, Pakistan will take the fall for the entire operation, by itself, America is off the hook. The world is slowly coming to realize what was done in FATA and NWFP, because the graduates of the militant academies which were established there have been plying the trade they learned there all over the world.  The world is holding Pakistan accountable for the terrorism these militants are commiting, no matter what.    Pakistan will go down alone, unless the generals prove to the world that this has been an American enterprise all along, which they merely been managing and operated under a deadly contract that began in 1979.]

4.      The New Yorker report harms the image of the Pakistani military leadership in the eyes of the soldiers and officers in middle and lower ranks.  This is especially relevant to the debate raging in official US circles about a mutiny within the Pakistan army.  Some American policymakers are deliberately using Afghanistan to push Pakistan to the wall in the hope that instability in Pakistan would reach a level where it could trigger a mutiny inside the Pakistani military against both the military leadership and the government.  Anyone who knows Pakistan will instantly understand that this notion is exaggerated, but this US debate should tell Pakistan's military leadership and people something about the destructive line of policy thinking that Washington is pursuing in Pakistan's neighborhood.

[Some of the attacks, even some being committed on the Army,  are being done by "former" military and ISI men, usually blamed on Taliban.   Consider the officers involved in the  attacks on Musharraf and the attack upon GHQ .  There is secret cooperation between the CIA and some unnamed officers of the Army on some level that amounts to waging war against the locals.]

Common wisdom in both the Pakistani political elite and some parts of the military bureaucracy says that 'engaging' the Americans on the subject of the security of Pakistani nukes can be beneficial to Pakistan. It would keep Washington engaged.  It would provide opportunities to milk the Americans of more aid money.

But no one in the policymaking circles is apparently weighing the downside: The 'engagement' is emboldening the Americans.  The 'engagement' – or secret talks, call them whatever you want – are sending the wrong signals to ordinary Pakistanis at a time when more of our people are convinced that Pakistan's troubles stem from American failures in Afghanistan.

Pakistani schools and colleges are under attack when those in Iraq and Afghanistan are safe.  This is happening because of American policy blunders and not just because of extremism inside Pakistan.  Our problems are also the result of Islamabad refusing to submit completely to the US military strategy that wants to give India a larger role in Afghanistan.  Pakistan, with a strong military and intelligence setup, is an obstacle in this strategy.

[That is precisely why American planners are working so hard to take Pakistan out of the way.  If they succeed in destroying the morale of the brave people of Pakistan, then a whole new level of pain will sweep over the land, with the idea of washing Pakistan back upon Indian shores.]

© 2007-2009. All rights reserved. AhmedQuraishi.com & PakNationalists

The original report is posted here


Email from a reader, Mr. Zeeba Khan to PakNationalists:

I think the problem in this country is that there is a race going on between the civilian and the military leadership to excel in terms of loyalty to the Americans. The interests of 170 mn people of this country is of no consequesnce. The most important thing is to pursue US interests, so that personal gains can be reaped from the situation. The accusation by  Seymour Hersch has been accepted by the top military brass by stating that they are engaging the Americans. Whether these engagements lead to pursuing Pakistan's interests or the personal interests of the 'engagers' remains to be seen. In the past personal interests have triumphed over national interests.

There is evidence to show that Pakistan army is totally committed to US interests. The military operations in Swat and Waziristan are proofs. Even when proofs of US involvement in Pakistan were found with the discovery of US arms from Swat (or Waziristan) ISPR spokesperson Gen Athar Abbas stated that these were stolen US arms. The army found the arms and ISPR spokesperson knew even before any investigation had been conducted that these were stolen arms. US interests are closer to his heart than Pakistan's.    


Nuclear Doubts: Pakistani Weakness Is Eroding Internal Morale, Fast





Seymour Hersh might have come up with some absurd findings, like concluding that religious extremism has multiplied in Pakistan because no one offered him Johnny Walker Black during his recent visit.  But apart from that, Pakistan's national security managers should sit up and take notice of one glaring fact: The US media and some circles in the Washington establishment are behind the worst global demonization campaign against Pakistan.  Now this is denting national morale and forcing Pakistanis to question if their military is capable of defending the nation, since politicians have proven to be a disaster.

By AHMED QURAISHI
Tuesday, 10 November 2009.

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan—Two curious aspects of the New Yorker story on Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is that the report singles out the Pakistani military – and not the civilian government – as partner in alleged secret negotiations with the Obama administration to secure Pakistan's nuclear weapons.  The other is the objective behind leaking the story – if indeed some US officials helped in leaking details – since the story only serves to make it more difficult for Pakistani officials cooperating with Washington on the nuclear question.

In May, when Boston Globe published a similar story quoting unnamed and unverifiable sources revealing that Pakistani officials have accepted a proposal to ship some highly enriched uranium to the United States for disposal, there was no reference whatsoever to Pakistani military.  The Globe depicted the talks as a government-to-government exercise.

For all intents, the latest story seeks to embarrass the Pakistani military.  This probably explains the immediate reaction of the US Ambassador to Pakistan Anne W. Patterson.  Not that she actually denied the alleged talks.  Her written statement was carefully worded to deny her government's "intention to seize Pakistani nuclear weapons or material."

The element of embarrassment also explains the statement of Pakistan’s Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee General Tariq Majid, who made it a point to respond to the question, 'How much does US really know about Pakistan's nuclear program?'  In a sharp public retort uncommon to Pakistan's top military brass, Gen. Majeed answered, ‘Only that much as they can guess and nothing more’.

Important parts of Mr. Seymour Hersh's investigative story remain unaddressed.  No government or military official has confirmed or denied the revelation in the New Yorker that former President Pervez Musharraf shared with US officials information about the number of warheads, their locations and their security plan.  Considering the embarrassing concessions that he gave the Americans [he allowed US diplomats, officials and military personnel unprecedented privileges at Pakistani airports at a time when Pakistani officials were humiliated on entry to US.  Pakistan has withdrawn those concessions.]

[It is also important to question some of Mr. Hersh's findings, which border on the ridiculous.  The last time Mr. Hersh visited Pakistan was five years ago by his own statement.  Yet he concluded that since the few politicians, journalists and retired generals he met this time did not offer him Johnny Walker Black this must be a sign of growing religious extremism in Pakistan and in the ranks of Pakistan military.  At other places, he has exaggerated the impact of two retired army officers that he interviewed on soldiers and middle rank officers.  Mr. Hersh appeared to have made little effort to use his visit to the country to try to understand the real Pakistan. Instead, he felt comfortable regurgitating media stereotypes. Which is fine since his report fits in with the overall US political and military policy thrust with regards to Pakistan.]

Mr. Hersh's report comes six months after the Boston Globe story that broke the news on behind-the-scenes talks between Islamabad and Washington on US proposals to secure Pakistan's nuclear weapons, including a US suggestion to ship out Pakistani uranium.  No one in Islamabad denied the story at the time.  The fixed Pakistani response to such stories has not changed much in recent years: that Pakistan has an excellent command and control regime and that Pakistan does not need outside help to secure its arsenal.

So, is the Pakistani government or military really talking secretly with the Americans on how to secure Pakistani nukes?

One explanation that retired military officers are giving is that Pakistani officers may be talking nukes to the Americans but not giving them the right information.  If true, this policy line seeks to keep the Americans engaged with Pakistan without allowing Washington any real access.

This is not farfetched. Pakistani civilian and military governments have perfected a uniquely Pakistani version of the American idiom, 'to roll with the punches and survive to fight another day.'  Only that Pakistan never really fights even for what is its legitimate right.  Under this policy, Islamabad has accepted on several occasions to play along, live with the accusations and insinuations about its nuclear program, and hope to stall, engage, and win over the antagonistic elements of the Washington establishment, both political and military.

But the latest report takes the debate to a new level.  Pakistani officials grappling with the PR aspect of this story need to consider the following:

1.       The latest report is particularly demoralizing for ordinary Pakistanis, in the backdrop of an overall deteriorating strategic environment for Pakistani interests, internal and external.  Pakistan's national security managers, civilian and military, need to pay attention to the hypothetical threshold of national morale.  Dangerously low levels of national morale could prove fatal in case of war with India or a US-led military invasion of Pakistani territory from Afghanistan.

2.      Is there someone in Washington, within its political, military and intelligence communities that might have an interest in embarrassing Pakistani officials who are allegedly engaged in secret nuclear talks with Washington?  Is someone trying to sabotage policy initiatives of the Obama administration?  In such a case, Pakistani officials – especially in the Pakistani intelligence community – need to give more weight to reports that anti-Pakistan activities orchestrated on Afghan soil cannot happen without some level of American involvement.

3.      That the US media continues to cause tremendous damage to Pakistan's reputation and standing in the international community.  Pakistan is receiving enemy treatment from the US media.  Pakistani officials must understand that US media cannot mount similar attacks on other countries such as Turkey and Egypt because leaderships in those countries generally keep US officials on a leash and leverage Washington's strategic needs to their favor. In Pakistan, we have a ruling elite that is micromanaged from Washington, thanks to a deal that former President Musharraf signed with Washington and London.

4.      The New Yorker report harms the image of the Pakistani military leadership in the eyes of the soldiers and officers in middle and lower ranks.  This is especially relevant to the debate raging in official US circles about a mutiny within the Pakistan army.  Some American policymakers are deliberately using Afghanistan to push Pakistan to the wall in the hope that instability in Pakistan would reach a level where it could trigger a mutiny inside the Pakistani military against both the military leadership and the government.  Anyone who knows Pakistan will instantly understand that this notion is exaggerated, but this US debate should tell Pakistan's military leadership and people something about the destructive line of policy thinking that Washington is pursuing in Pakistan's neighborhood.

Common wisdom in both the Pakistani political elite and some parts of the military bureaucracy says that 'engaging' the Americans on the subject of the security of Pakistani nukes can be beneficial to Pakistan. It would keep Washington engaged.  It would provide opportunities to milk the Americans of more aid money.

But no one in the policymaking circles is apparently weighing the downside: The 'engagement' is emboldening the Americans.  The 'engagement' – or secret talks, call them whatever you want – are sending the wrong signals to ordinary Pakistanis at a time when more of our people are convinced that Pakistan's troubles stem from American failures in Afghanistan.

Pakistani schools and colleges are under attack when those in Iraq and Afghanistan are safe.  This is happening because of American policy blunders and not just because of extremism inside Pakistan.  Our problems are also the result of Islamabad refusing to submit completely to the US military strategy that wants to give India a larger role in Afghanistan.  Pakistan, with a strong military and intelligence setup, is an obstacle in this strategy.

© 2007-2009. All rights reserved. AhmedQuraishi.com & PakNationalists
Verbatim copying and distribution of this entire article is permitted in any medium